Indonesia to Pull Out of OPEC

Indonesia to Pull Out of OPEC

By Anthony Deutsch
Associated Press
Thursday, May 29, 2008; Page D08

JAKARTA, Indonesia, May 28 -- Declining oil reserves and investment have forced Indonesia to quit the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries even as other members cash in on soaring global prices, Energy Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said Wednesday.

Purnomo said Southeast Asia's only OPEC member no longer belonged among such exporting heavyweights as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Kuwait. Indonesia is the region's largest oil producer, but it has had to import for years because of aging wells and disappointing exploration efforts. The nation's oil production of roughly 1 million barrels a day is at its lowest level in 30 years.

"Indonesia is pulling out of OPEC," Purnomo told reporters, days after his government slashed fuel subsidies that have long protected the poor, forcing prices at the pump to jump by nearly 30 percent. "We are not happy with the high oil price."

Purnomo said the decision to leave OPEC was made by the cabinet of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who said this month that the country needed to concentrate on increasing production.

Indonesia, which was among the first to join after OPEC was founded in 1960, will remain a member until the end of the year. It will leave open the option of returning if it can build up a surplus. But right now, the energy minister said, we "are a consuming country."

Victor Shum, an energy analyst with Purvin & Gertz in Singapore, said pulling out of OPEC will save Jakarta the $3.1 million annual fee but cost it some international prestige. "I don't see any substantive loss, other than on the prestige," he said. "They have been an oil importer . . . They really have not had much influence within the OPEC organization."

Former OPEC secretary general Subroto, who like many Indonesians goes by only one name, said giving up the seat on the 13-member body would strip the country of its ability to influence global oil prices during times of crisis. "If we remain in OPEC there is some obligation from other members, if problems arise, to assist us," he said, adding that in his mind there was "no benefit" to leaving.

Indonesia, which has subsidized fuel heavily for decades, was facing a deficit with global oil prices now hovering at around $130 a barrel. Its 2008 budget was drafted using an average price of $85 a barrel for the whole year -- a figure later revised to $95.

The government began reducing fuel subsidies in 2000, but it still spends billions of dollars to help consumers cover the costs of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, which is used by low-income families for cooking.

Even after last week's hike, rich and poor alike still pay just $2.80 for a gallon of gas.

Purnomo said the long-term policy was to eliminate subsidies altogether, because they undermine market forces and encourage smuggling to other countries. But he said another increase was not expected this year.

Last week's subsidy cut triggered small, but rowdy protests by students and workers, but was hailed by economists who said Yudhoyono had taken the biggest step he could without threatening economic growth.

Ex-Colleagues Ask, 'What Happened?'

Ex-Colleagues Ask, 'What Happened?'
Former Bush Aide Stuns Many With Critical New Book
By Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, May 29, 2008; Page A02

Scott McClellan was the ultimate Bush loyalist. He went to work for George W. Bush when he was Texas governor in 1999, helped Bush gain the White House in 2000, and then came to Washington to defend the president for the next six years on such issues as the war in Iraq and Hurricane Katrina.

But McClellan's explosive new book, which alleges that the Bush administration waged a "political propaganda campaign" in favor of the Iraq war and bungled the response to the storm that devastated the Gulf Coast, prompted a counterattack yesterday from some of his oldest political colleagues, who accused him of disloyalty and questioned his credibility.

Dana Perino, the current White House press secretary, said the president was "surprised" by McClellan's assertions. "He is puzzled, and he doesn't recognize this as the Scott McClellan that he hired and confided in and worked with for so many years," Perino said, adding that Bush was "disappointed that if he had these concerns and these thoughts, he never came to him or anyone else on the staff."

Former Bush political adviser Karl Rove compared McClellan to a "left-wing blogger," and former White House counselor Dan Bartlett told CNN it was "misguided for him to make these kind of broad accusations and draw these big conclusions about the president."

Several former Bush administration officials have written tell-all accounts. In one book published this month, retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez accuses Bush and his top advisers of "gross incompetence and dereliction of duty" for their handling of the Iraq war.

But none was as close to Bush or his inner circle as McClellan, 40, an amiable Texas native who was widely known for his cautious demeanor. He started out in politics by managing several state election campaigns in the 1990s for his mother, who became Texas comptroller, and was recruited to the governor's mansion by Bush confidante Karen Hughes.

Ari Fleischer, who served as White House press secretary before McClellan took over in 2003, said he first met McClellan in Austin in 1999 when the two worked on the Bush presidential campaign.

"That's one of the reasons this book comes as such a shock," Fleischer said. "It comes from the last person that anyone would have thought would have said these things or written these things. . . . All you can do is scratch your head when you see how far he's turned."

Trent Duffy, who worked as McClellan's deputy for more than two years, said of the avid University of Texas sports fan: "Tomorrow maybe we're going to learn he's rooting for the Oklahoma Sooners."

"Here's a man who owes his whole career to George W. Bush, and here he's stabbing him in the back and no one knows why," Duffy said. "He appears to be dancing on his political grave for cash."

McClellan, who did not respond to a request for comment yesterday, suggests in his preface that he expected a negative reaction. "My friends and former colleagues who lived and worked or are still living and working inside that bubble may not be happy with the perspective I present here," he wrote.

In the book, "What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception," McClellan says he retains great admiration for Bush but portrays the president as stubborn and isolated. Calling the Iraq war "unnecessary" and a "strategic blunder," McClellan alleges that senior administration officials began a campaign in 2002 to "aggressively sell the war," even as he and other officials insisted that all options were on the table.

He also accuses Rove of misleading him about the leak of a CIA officer's name, and he suggests that Rove and former vice presidential adviser I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby may have improperly met to discuss the case. Perino and other officials sharply criticized that assertion yesterday.

When he was press secretary, McClellan made some of the same arguments against other ex-officials that he now faces. In 2004, for example, former counterterrorism adviser Richard A. Clarke published a book sharply critical of Bush's anti-terrorism policies.

"Why, all of a sudden, if he had all these grave concerns, did he not raise these sooner?" McClellan said. "This is 1 1/2 years after he left the administration. . . . He is bringing this up in the heat of a presidential campaign. He has written a book, and he certainly wants to go out there and promote that book."

Staff writers Michael Abramowitz in Colorado Springs and Thomas E. Ricks in Washington and staff researcher Madonna Lebling in Washington contributed to this report.

The National Awakening Day

The people of Indonesia were reminded by a historical passage through which the nation has walked toward its independence. we just commemorated the 100th year of national awakening. Leaders of this country heralded the second turn of national awakening century which forces us to fight against poverty, backwardness, and horrendous corruption which have killed millions of people.

Just have a look at the film below about how the young people seem to forget their nation's destiny. We are entering the era of ignorance. Whom should I blame for this? Does modernisation entail the brainwashing process which erase our collective memory? The film was directed by Nizar.



27 May 2008

What Is Shari'ah?

What Is Shari'ah?
Tamara Sonn


For many people, the term shariʿah sets off alarm bells. Visions of court-ordered amputations and stoning arise in the popular imagination. Commentators point out that the European Court of Human Rights has pronounced some components of shariʿah, particularly those dealing with pluralism and public freedoms, incompatible with fundamental principles of democracy. And fears of “creeping shariʿah” have inspired hundreds of Web sites warning that Muslim fanatics intend to reestablish the caliphate and bring the entire world under Islam’s harsh legal system.

The concerns expressed in these reactions reflect a common misunderstanding of the term shariʿah. The misunderstanding stems from the fact that the term has two meanings. In its most common usage, shariʿah (way, path) refers to Islamic law. Muslim countries throughout the world have shariʿah courts, which deal with matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In some countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the jurisdiction of shariʿah law extends also to certain aspects of criminal and commercial law. Both countries, for example, incorporate the ḥudūd punishments into their legal codes. The ḥudūd punishments—such as stoning for adultery and amputation of the hand for theft—were established in the earliest days of Islam and are considered mandatory, unlike other crimes which are punishable at the discretion of a judge and may be dealt with through compensation or retribution. As a result, many people assume that all Islamic laws are fixed and unchanging. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights ruling mentioned above characterizes shariʿah as “stable and invariable.”

But shariʿah has a much broader meaning as well. It encompasses the core beliefs and practices of Islam, revealed in the Qur'ān and exemplified by the Prophet Muḥammad in the Sunnah, as well as the laws that are derived from those sources. While the core beliefs and practices remain stable, the laws derived from them change over time and display significant diversity. That is because most of the laws are derived from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah through interpretation. The Qur'ān does contain some specific legislation, including regulation of inheritance, for example. Most authorities believe that those regulations are not subject to interpretation. But the majority of the Qur'ān’s teachings are in the form of moral guidance and recommendations, which require human effort to be put into specific law codes. The human effort at understanding the legal implications of the Qur'ān and Sunnah is called fiqh (understanding).

The term fiqh is also used to refer to the laws devised by human effort. Unlike shariʿah laws which are believed to be of divine origin and thus perfect and unchanging, fiqh laws are human products and therefore recognized as imperfect and subject to revision. Indeed, the body of Islamic law has been developing for over fourteen centuries and has adapted to diverse conditions and changing circumstances and five major schools of Islamic legal reasoning have developed. As in any other legal system, interpretations have diverged, some laws have become obsolete, and others have emerged. One of the official “roots” of fiqh is intellectual effort (ijtihād), whose purpose is to allow for reinterpretation of the laws when circumstances warrant it.

The body of Islamic law does undoubtedly contain elements that are startling in the light of contemporary Western norms. And today, there is lively debate among Muslim scholars over many of the laws that most concern non-Muslim observers, particularly those dealing with democracy, pluralism, the rights of women and of minorities, and the status of the traditional ḥudūd punishments.

Many contemporary Islamic thinkers fully endorse pluralism, including full equality for all citizens. Egypt’s Fahmiʿ Huwaydiʿ, for example, argues for equal rights for non-Muslim minorities based on the overall goal of Islamic law, which is to establish justice. In order to achieve justice in today’s world, he says, democracy is essential. Democracy has been shown to be successful in the West, and it is the most effective way to implement the Qur'ān’s command to govern through consultation (shūrā). While shūrā has been exercised in various ways throughout history, in order to result in justice today it must be anchored in a government that recognizes the right of people to choose their ruler, and this right must be shared equally by all citizens. Egyptian legal scholar Salim al-Awa (Saliʿm al-عAwwā) also argues in favor of democracy, saying that Islam places authority with the people, and all citizens have equal rights to choose, women and non-Muslims included.

Exiled Tunisian thinker Rachid Ghannouchi (Rāshid Ghannūshiʿ) argues for Muslim participation in secular democracies, again based on the Qur'ānic principle of participatory governance, shūrā, which he defines as the authority of the community. Muslims must work with whoever is willing to help achieve essential Islamic goals such as “independence, development, social solidarity, civil liberties, human rights, political pluralism, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, or liberty for mosques and Islamic activities.”

Leading European Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan concludes that any government conforming to Islamic principles must allow for communal consultation, including both men and women, and that the most efficient means of doing that today is through a consultative council made up of elected members. He also insists that any representatives be chosen on the basis of competence in various areas pertinent to daily life, rather than heredity or some other unearned criterion. This competence allows them to exercise ijtihād, that is, to deliberate and formulate ways to achieve Islamic principles in today’s circumstances, instead of relying on models appropriate to circumstances that no longer exist. Consequently, Ramadan concludes, Islam is completely opposed to theocracy. Not only must Islamic government be conducted through consultation, it also requires freedom of conscience. This is based on Ramadan’s reading of the Qur'ān’s prohibition of compulsion in matters of religion (2:256). Thus, he says, people must have the right to choose their leaders, express their opinions, and live—male and female, Muslims and non-Muslim—under equal protection of the law, as was the case in the Prophet’s time under the Constitution of Medina. He argues that, although there is no unique model of Islamic government, basic principles have been provided which Ramadan calls “a framework to run pluralism.”

In a similar vein, Ramadan recommends a moratorium on the implementation of ḥudūd punishments. Other scholars agree, focusing specifically on the prohibition of apostasy (renouncing one’s religion). For example, the former chief justice of Pakistan, Dr. S. A. Rahman, argues that the prohibition of apostasy under threat of capital punishment violates the Qur'ān’s fundamental insistence on freedom of conscience. Egypt’s highest religious authority, Grand Muftiʿ Ali Gomaa (عAlī Jumعah), also rejects the death sentence for apostasy, arguing that if punishment is due, it will come in the afterlife. There is even debate about whether or not some of the ḥudūd punishments have been properly understood and interpreted in the first place. Tunisian historian Mohamed Talbi explains that the law requiring capital punishment for apostasy resulted from a confusion of apostasy with treason. Leading American Muslim scholar Professor Ali A. Mazrui takes a slightly different approach. He argues for rethinking the ḥudūd punishments, saying that the punishments laid down fourteen centuries ago “had to be truly severe enough to be a deterrent” in their day, but “since then God has taught us more about crime, its causes,the methods of its investigation, the limits of guilt, and the much wider range of possible punishments.”

There is wide ranging opinion regarding precisely which laws should be subjected to ijtihād. It is common for conservative scholars to identify the laws they believe should be preserved as shariʿah and therefore not subject to ijtihād. Reformist thinkers tend to place greater emphasis on the distinction between shariʿah and fiqh. This discussion has been a feature of Islamic discourse throughout history.

Renowned jurisconsult Ibn Taymiʿyah (d. 1328) criticized those who fail to distinguish between the technical usage of shariʿah as the ideal, revealed will of God, and its generic usage to refer to specific legal codes, and cautioned against confusing the decisions of ignorant or unjust judges with shariʿah. Shariʿah texts even provide a measure by which laws can be judged as just or not: the “purposes” or “goals” (maqāṣid) of shariʿah. Those goals include the preservation of human rights, defined as the right to life, religion, family, property, and reason. If those rights are not being served, the laws must be rethought.

It is true that Muslims stress the eternity and universality of shariʿah, but that does not imply that all Islamic laws are unchangeable or that everyone must be ruled by Islamic law. It means that the values and goals of shariʿah are meant to cover all aspects of life. Some scholars even claim that any laws that fulfill the goals of shariʿah are Islamic in nature, if not in name. It is also true that there are Muslims who believe that the world would be better off if it were guided by shariʿah. Except for an outspoken few, however, this position is a spiritual, not political, one.

Bibliography
Al-Awa, Muhammad Salim. “Political Pluralism from an Islamic Perspective.” In Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., pp. 279–287. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Ghannouchi, Rachid. “Participation in Non-Islamic Governments.” In Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, edited by Charles Kurzman, pp. 89–95. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Huwaydī, Fahmī. Muwāṭinūn la Dhimīyūn (Citizens, Not Protected People). Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1985.
Rahman, Fazlur. Islam. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Talbi, Mohamed. “Religious Liberty.” In Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, edited by Charles Kurzman, pp. 161–168. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Israel Turns 60

A History of a Conflict

May 14 marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the state of Israel. While Arabs call the day "the catastrophe," many Israelis aren't in the mood to celebrate. A look back on six decades of dreams and nightmares. Peter Philipp reports

On May 14, 1948, the leaders of Palestine's Jewish population, the Yishuv, gathered in Tel Aviv's museum to realize the dream that had begun taking shape over decades of growing Jewish immigration: to establish the Jewish state propagated by the father of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl.

The opportunity had finally arrived. Just hours before the British Mandate over Palestine came to an end and the British high commissioner left the country, David Ben-Gurion declared the founding of the state of Israel.

The Israelis quickly recognized that the realization of their dream actually meant a shift from one nightmare to the next: from persecution and annihilation in Europe to latent war and open threats to their existence.

For decades most people in the Middle East refused to accept Israel's existence, or even its right to exist. Israel's independence day became known as the Nakba, the catastrophe, in Arabic and continues to be called that.

Celebrations followed by grenades

Within hours the statehood celebrations were interrupted by the droning of bombs and grenades, and Israel was forced to fight its first war.

The states of the Arab league, which had been founded not long before, hoped to exterminate the new entity they believed the West had brought upon them - the British with the Balfour Declaration, in which they promised the Jews support in the establishment of a national homeland in 1917; the UN with its 1947 Partition Plan for Palestine; and the United States with its active support for the foundation of the state of Israel.

Against all expectations, the Arab plan failed. Israel expanded its territory even beyond the lines of the partition. More than 750,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their homes - out of fear for their lives or because they were expelled. They remain the central problem in the conflict 60 years later -- and their numbers have grown to around 4 million.

The 1948 defeat affected the Arabs - indeed the whole Muslim world - deeply.

They were unwilling to accept the result and vowed vengeance. And because the Arabs were loath to admit their defeat at the hands of the tiny Jewish state, they held the West responsible for it. Thus, the legend arose that nurtures radical groups and demagogues to this day: Israel as the outpost of an anti-Arabic and anti-Islamic West in the Middle East, just as the crusaders were hundreds of years ago.

Common cause

Israel's enemies believe they have repeatedly seen their thesis confirmed. In 1956, they saw as confirmation that Israel, France and Britain joined forces in the Suez Crisis.

The Europeans were concerned about the Suez Canal, while the Israelis wanted to ensure the security of their border to Egypt. During the Cold War, Egypt, Syria and Iraq became allies with Moscow, which strengthened all the more the connection between the US and Israel and conservative Arab states.

The most important change came after the Six-Day War in June 1967. Despite Israeli warnings, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, giving Israel an excuse for a preventive strike.

Jordan and Syria's intervention was no help to Cairo. Within six days, Israel had seized the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

Suddenly Israel controlled all of historic Palestine. Some Israelis were hopeful that a call would come from Amman or Cairo offering peace in exchange for occupied territory. But the telephone didn't ring. Instead, in Khartoum, the Arab League declared its "Three No's": no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.

Peace with the arch-enemy

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Arabs succeeded in improving their damaged self-confidence, with Syria and Egypt causing heavy damage to Israel. But the war ended without victors. The new constellation, however, allowed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to start a peace initiative which culminated in the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978.

The Palestinians could have been part of the peace agreement, but with encouragement from the Arab world, they rejected it.

It wasn't until 15 years later, in 1993, that Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat agreed on the Oslo peace plan, which was meant to lead to Israel pulling out of the occupied territories and the foundation of a Palestinian state.

Finally the most important Palestinian groups were willing to accept the two-state solution recommended by the UN Partition Plan 46 years previously.

Rabin's assassination

But resistance came from the Israeli side too. Likud party nationalists under Benjamin Netanyahu denounced what they said was a betrayal of the historic homeland, as they viewed all of Palestine as Eretz Yisrael, belonging to the land of Israel. They warned against the dangers for Israel of giving up the occupied territories.

In November 1995 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had signed the Oslo Accords, was assassinated. The following year, Netanyahu was elected prime minister, and Israel began to sabotage the implementation of the Oslo plan.

Growing dissatisfaction among Palestinians added to the political crisis in Israel. In autumn 2000 the second Intifada started.

In the course of the "al-Aqsa Intifada" nearly every positive development in the Palestinian territories was destroyed: autonomous self-administration once again became occupied territories, and Israel, under Ariel Sharon, started to close itself off from the Palestinians behind a gigantic wall.

No compromise

It was only after Arafat's death, in November 2004, and with great effort, that negotiations resumed, but they failed to bring results. At the same time, those opposed to any kind of settlement gained ever more influence. In early 2006, Hamas won elections in the Palestinian territories.

The Islamist group refused to recognize Israel or the Oslo Accords, and the Palestinians again became isolated, particularly from the West. Israel was intransigent, deciding to make no more compromises. The situation in the Gaza Strip, which Israel had evacuated, began to resemble war.

That US President George W. Bush wanted to finish his last year in office with peace in the Middle East made no difference. There was nothing to indicate he would succeed.

Instead, the atmosphere among Palestinians and Israelis continues to deteriorate. The Palestinians fight among themselves. Israel intends to spend millions on celebrating the 60th anniversary of statehood, but even that is controversial. The anniversary year was declared the "Year of Youth." But critics point out that over one-third of young Israelis live below the poverty level - which is certainly nothing to celebrate.

Peter Philipp

© DEUTSCHE WELLE 2008

Liberal Islamic Networks in Indonesia

In recent years Indonesia has seen the development of a network of various Muslim NGOs that convey a contemporary understanding of Islam, working to counter the advance of Islamization.

The island state of Indonesia has always been regarded as a prime example of tolerance in action, where ethnic groups and different religious communities coexist peacefully.

"Unity in diversity" is the self-image of the secular state based on the so-called "Pancasila" philosophy which attempts to integrate different religions such as Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as different languages and cultures.

Indonesia's Islam purists are gaining ground

However, amidst social problems that have been on the rise since the 1990s and are often stylized into religious conflicts, violent attacks on minorities have increased, and radical Islamic splinter groups threaten the country's social peace.

The end of the Suharto dictatorship and the beginning of the so-called "Reformasi" era in the late 1990s did bring tangible democratization to Indonesia's state and society. However, those who profited from the new freedoms included not only liberal parties and civil society actors committed to tolerance and democracy, but also proponents of radical Islam.

Today political Islam is gaining ground in Indonesia. Groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) preach a conservative, one-sided image of Islam. They demand the country-wide introduction of the Islamic penal code and crusade against everything in society they consider decadent and immoral.

The battle for public opinion

To offer a counterbalance to radical Islam in the world's most populous Muslim country, numerous liberal Muslim groups have been founded, such as the "Liberal Islam Network" (Jaringan Islam Liberal), which was established in 2001 in the capital of Jakarta.

The organization's stated goal is to encourage dialogue among Islamic groups with a liberal understanding of Islam and to create a journalistic platform for analysis, background reports and interviews. "We also conduct workshops, public discussions and radio talk shows to discuss the current challenges for Muslim society following the end of the Suharto era," explains Luthfi Assyaukanie, coordinator of Jaringan Islam Liberal.

The Islamic scholar and lecturer at the Paramadina University in Jakarta knows exactly what he is talking about when he emphasizes the significance of his organization's educational and publicity work: "We are now living in a democratic society. However, if we do not enrich it with our views, the radicals will try to fill this gap. We see ourselves as a reply to the rising Islamism in Indonesia."

Maintaining the existing order

Luthfi Assyaukanie's "Liberal Islam Network" is a small movement dominated by young journalists and Islamic scholars. They are committed to inter-religious dialogue and to maintaining the secularism and pluralism of Indonesian society.

The group emphatically rejects the literal interpretation of the Koran and advocates a contemporary Islam that respects freedom of opinion, women's rights and tolerance toward minorities and other religious communities.

According to Assyaukanie, the network's activists see themselves as standing in the tradition of the 19th century Islamic reform movement. Their role models are Mohammad 'Abduh, Ali Abdel Razeq and Rashid Rida.

Similarly, for eight years the Indonesian women's rights organization "Rahima" has been taking an Islamic perspective on women's emancipation and fighting for a political voice for women in Indonesian society, among other things.

The organization sees educational work as its primary task, especially in the rural districts of Central Java. "Rahima" cooperates especially closely with teaching staff at Islamic boarding schools, the so-called "pesantren", and at other Islamic Institutions, where they advocate for a modern understanding of Islam.

Educational work on the local level

"When Rahima was founded, the primary goal of our work was to reach the Islamic boarding schools in the country and their directors (Qiay), the second step being to sensitize the teachers at these schools to our issues," explains "Rahima" director Aditiana Dewi Erdani.

At special seminars and training sessions, private lecturers are trained to act as mediators, communicating their liberal conceptions of Islam to students and teachers in the local communities.

This strategy is also shared by other liberal Islamic organizations: for instance, for years "Rahima" has cooperated successfully with the "Wahid Institute", named after the country's former president and probably its best-known Islamic scholar, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

Education and dialogue as the key to success

Founded in 2004, the "Wahid Institute" is another NGO committed to a tolerant, pluralistic Islam and to democratic reforms in Indonesia.

Just like "Rahima", the organization targets Islamic boarding schools (pesantren); forming an independent school system, they are largely free from state control and hence harbor the greatest danger that the advance of Wahhabism will subject students and teachers to Islamist indoctrination, says Ahmad Suaedy, deputy director of the "Wahid Institute":

"We make it easier for the 'silent majority of Muslims', the teachers at the Islamic boarding schools as well as the local leaders, to discuss Islam and peace, Islam and pluralism, and in some regions we enable them to talk together about their difficulties on the radio and in the local media", says Suaedy.

All the groups in the liberal Islamic network share one main approach toward curbing the influence of Islamist hardliners: education and dialogue as the key to mutual understanding in the multiethnic state of Indonesia.

Arian Fariborz

© Qantara.de 2008

Translated from the German by Isabel Cole

A Brief Mapping of Islamic Education in Indonesia

Jamhari and Jajat Burhanudin
PPIM UIN Jakarta

The recent development of Indonesian Islam indicates that Islamic educational institutions survive amidst changes within Muslim communities. Pesantren, the oldest Islamic educational institution, is evidence of this. Pesantren, madrasah, and Islamic schools continue to grow and parental interest in sending their children to Islamic education institution is even stronger today than in the past.

Data from the Department of Religious Affairs shows a steady increase in the number of pesantren and students enrolled in them. In 1977, there were 4,195 pesantren with 677,384 students. This number skyrocketed in 1981 with pesantren numbering 5,661 with a total of 938,397 students. In 1985, this number increased to 6,239 pesantren with 1,084,801 students. In 1997, the Department reported 9,388 pesantren a total of 1,770,768 students. And finally, 2003-04, the number of pesantren reached 14,647. A similar trend is also evident with madrasah.

Madrasah, managed by the Department of Religious Affairs, also experienced rapid quality and quantity development. Development trends are also evident in Islamic schools. For example, Al-Azhar School in Jakarta, Insan Cendikia and Madania in West Java, and Mutahhari in Bandung have grown significantly in urban regions of the country. Similar developments are also found in Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar.

These data raise some important questions concerning the development and survival of Islamic educational institutions, as well as their changing roles amid transitions taking place in the Muslim community. Islamic educational institutions face complex challenges. They not only strive to educate Muslims in religious knowledge, but are also expected to participate in creating a new socio-cultural and political system of Indonesia. Based on the characteristics of Islamic educational institutions, there are at least four types of Islamic educational institutions: (1) NU-based Islamic boarding schools, (2) modern Islamic boarding schools whose orientation are Islamic reformism, (3) independent pesantrens, and (4) Islamic schools.

NU-based Pesantren
Strong waves of Islamic education reform, which occurred along with Islamic reformism, touched pesantren. While maintaining the traditional aspects of the education system, a number of pesantren in Java have, at the same time, begun to adopt the madrasah system. The experience of Pesantren Tebuireng Jombang East Java is important to note. Founded by a charismatic and outstanding ulama of the 20th century, Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari (1871–1947), Pesantren Tebuireng set the model for pesantren and ulama, especially in Java. Almost all of the important pesantren in Java have been founded by disciples of Kyai Hasim Asy’ari, therefore following the Tebuireng model. Together with the NU, which he founded in 1926, Kyai Hasyim had a central and strategic position in the legacies of ulama in Java. As such, he is known as the Hadratus Syaikh (Big Master) for ulama in Java.

Attempts to reform the educational system of pesantren began during the 1930s. The NU-based pesantren adopted the madrasah system by opening a six-grade system consisting of a preparatory grade for one year followed by a madrasah grade for six additional years. Furthermore the pesantren also included non-Islamic sciences in its curriculum such as Dutch language, history, geography, and math. This process continued as the pesantren was managed by his son Kyai Abdul Wahid Hasyim (1914– 53), whose concerns were to bring the legacies of pesantren into modernity. During the 1950s, he made madrasah system the main model of education in Tebuireng.

Tebuireng was not the only pesantren to make changes to its system. Pesantren Krapyak of Yogyakarta also became part of the reformist movement in the early 20th century. Kyai Ali Maksum (1915–89), the founder and the pesantren leader of Krapyak was recognized as a figure with a “modernist spirit.” Like Kyai Wahid Hasyim of Tebuireng, he also combined the madrasah into pesantren systems. In addition, Pesantren Tambak Beras and Pesantren Rejoso, both in Jombang, also adopted reformist agenda by implementing the madrasah system by introducing non-Islamic knowledge into their curriculum.

It can be concluded that, along with socio-religious changes following modernization and Islamic reformism, the transformation of Islamic education became a part of general discourse within Indonesian Islam at the beginning of the 20th century. The pesantren ulama, strictly holding the traditional legacies of Islam, gradually transformed the educational sytem by adopting the modern system of madrasahs. In addition, the main orientation of pesantren also changed form a focus on producing ulama. Instead, like other modern Muslim groups, the learning system of Pesantren Tebuireng is directed toward a larger agenda, “to educate students to be able to develop themselves to be ‘intellectual ulama’ (ulama mastering secular knowledge) and ‘ulama intellectual’ (scholars mastering secular as well as religious knowledge.”

This type of pesantren, culturally based on the NU tradition, has been growing steadily and can be found in almost every city in Java. In West Sumatra, this type of pesantren is affiliated with Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah), a kaum tua-affiliated organization like the NU in Java. In Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, the position of NU is assumed by the local Nahdhatul Watan (NW). Like NU and Perti, NW has become the cultural bases for traditional Islamic education institutions in Lombok as well as religious bases in the region. Similarly, As’adiyah in South Sulawesi has also played an important role like that of NU in Java, NW in NTB, and Perti in West Sumatra.

Modern Pesantren
In the history of Islamic education in Indonesia, this type of pesantren is said to be the first institution to create the principles for reforming Islamic education within the pesantren system. Pesantren Darussalam Gontor Ponorogo, founded on September 20, 1926 by three brothers (KH. Ahmad Sahal, KH. Zainuddin Fannani, and KH. Imam Zarkasyi) was the first modern pesantren designed to provide education able to respond to challenges faced by the Muslim community amidst changes in the socio-cultural life in Indonesia in the modern-day period.

Pesantren Gontor was founded during a period of important development for Indonesian Muslims. Forced by modernization by the Dutch colonial government (also known as “ethical politics”) and affected by changes in international networks centering Islamic reformism in Cairo, Egypt, Islamic education in Indonesia underwent fundamental changes. These changes were evident in the emergence of new Islamic educational institutions, especially those established by the first modern Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, that adopted a modern system aimed at reforming the traditional educational system. As such, Islamic educational institutions became important parts of the Islamic reformism movement since the early 20th century.

In addition to introducing a new system and learning method—grade system, textbook, and non-religious subjects in the curriculum—pesantren also functioned as the medium to disseminate the ideas of Islamic reformism. It became the basis of creating new Muslims familiar with the spirit of modernism and progress, which had become a dominant discourse in Indonesia. Here the socio and religious dimension of madrasah can be clearly identified. Different from the type of pesantren that only provided classical religious learning and a kyai-centric system, madrasah provided a new religious perspective to respond to modernity. Unlike pesantren which functioned as the fabric of the ulama, madrasah were designed to create the so-called “learning Muslims.”

It is by this design that the foundation of Pesantren Gontor can be explained. It aimed to create new Muslims who could master either religious or secular knowledge as well as various life skills needed by the changing community. Since its inception, Gontor identified itself as a modern educational institution in contrast to a traditional pesantren which had been plagued with stagnancy and ineffective educational management. Imam Zarkasyi, one of Gontor’s founding fathers, saw that modern pesantren should apply freedom of thought, effective and efficient management, and adopt modern idea of progress (kemajuan) as well as modern devices. Like most Muslim reformers, he emphasized the need for madhab flexibility, which without would sometimes lead to stagnancy.

One aspect of this modernization can be seen in the system of Kulliyat al-Muallimin al-Islamiyah (KMI), a secondary grade system consisting of a six-year duration (equivalent to secondary and high schools). This KMI system is a combination of madrasah and pesantren systems. This combination is a result of Zarkasyi’s experiences in Pesantren Manbaul Ulum Solo, Sumatera Thawalib Padang Panjang, and Normal Islam School (also called KMI) and as founder and director of Kweekschool Muhammadiyah in Padang Sidempuan. In the classroom, students study and learn just like students of madrasah and other public schools do. However, outside of the classroom, students engage in various activities such as organization training, life skills, arts, sports, and scouting.

This concept of modern pesantren became the blueprint as a number of his students spread across the country established similar pesantren, usually called “the Alumni’s Pesantren” (meaning Gontor Alumni), named after the second generation who influenced the pesantren model in the next wave of development. From 1970–80, a number of Gontor alumni founded pesantren within their home regions. For example, Pesantren Daar El-Qalam Gintung Balaraja in Banten, Pesantren Al-Amin Prenduan Sumenep in Madura, and Pesantren Pabelan in Central Java, among many others.

Independent Pesantren
A new trend has recently emerged in Indonesia in the context of the development of pesantren and, to some extent, madrasah. This new trend is the presence of pesantren and madrasah that are independent in the sense that they have no affiliation with any Muslim mass organization. Instead, they are based largely on Salafi ideological beliefs.

It is difficult to know precisely when this new trend emerged. Even so, it is believed that the presence of independent pesantren and schools are closely related to the rise of Salafism in Indonesia in the 1980s. During this period, the advent and influence of Salafism can be identified with the emergence of so-called usroh groups. From a religious doctrine perspective, these groups follow the earlier Salafi figures such as Ahmad ibn Hambal and Ibn Taymiyah whose ideas were absorbed and developed by later figures such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb through Ikhwan al-Muslimin in Egypt and Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi through Jema’at Islami in the India sub-continent. The doctrines of Salafism as developed by these figures have become the main reference for these groups.

To give an example, Pesantren Hidayatullah is based on contextualization of Salafi religious beliefs. This fact (to be demonstrated in the following section of statistical analysis) can be seen in the teachings developed by Ustadz Abdullah Said who created the idea of Muslim community (jemaah Islamiyah) (community who implements Islamic values in a comprehensive manner). Jemaah, in the context of the Islamic movement is frequently paralleled with hizb (party) and harakah (movement), although the concept of jemaah is used more widely than the other two. It is very frequently understood as a Muslim community more superior than others and as one claiming that the only solution they have is the correct one.

Another important characteristic of this group is the model of literal interpretation toward religious texts. As a result, they have a distinct physical appearance. For instance, males wear ghamis (an Arab garment for men) and have long beards, while females wear jilbab and veil, covering all parts of their bodies except for the eyes and hands. According to Islamic teaching, females are not allowed to show their bodies except to their husbands.

In Indonesia these groups have interestingly emerged in prominent public universities such Universitas Indonesia (UI), Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), and Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB). However, in Islamic universities such as State Islamic Institutes/Universities (UIN/IAIN), they are hardly found. After the fall of Suharto, groups calling themselves Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) began to emerge in predominantly Muslim universities. Their movement has become an important social and religious movement in Indonesia. At the political level, these groups gave support for the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Welfare Justice Party, PKS), one of the leading Muslim-based parties in Indonesia.

Islamic Schools
In essence, the system and organization of Islamic schools is similar to public schools (although most of them necessitate being a Muslim as a requirement from students) with an emphasis on Islamic moral conduct. As such, these schools can be categorized as “public school plus.” This means that religious courses on Islamic history, Islamic jurisprudence, or Islamic theology are not the main subjects of the curriculum like that of pesantren and of most madrasah. Instead, there is an emphasis on how religion can inspire good moral conduct in the daily lives of the students.

Islamic schools were created to cater to the Muslim middle class in urban areas. These schools are equipped with good facilities such as air-conditioned classrooms, libraries, labs, and computer facilities. As a modern institution, these schools are administered by professionals in management as well as curriculum development. Teachers, staff, and managers are recruited in a competitive and professional manner by considering their skills and competency levels.

Yayasan Pesantren Islam (YPI) Al-Azhar, founded on April 7, 1952, is one of the best examples of Islamic schools. As of 2004, Al-Azhar has managed as many as 78 schools from kindergarten to high school, spread over several provinces including Jakarta, Banten, West Java, and East Java. In 2002, YPI founded a university named Universitas Al-Azhar Indonesia (UAI).

In addition to Al-Azhar, other independent schools oriented toward science and technology include SMU Insan Cendikia in Banten and Gorontalo in Sulawesi. These schools were founded in 1996 by a number of scientists mostly affiliated with the Commission for Research, Development and Application of Technology (BPPT) under the Ministry of Research and Technology through the Science and Technology Equity Program (STEP) for schools within pesantren.

During its development, Islamic schools have grown not only in Jakarta but also in other large cities throughout Indonesia. For example, in West Sumatra there exists Kompleks Perguruan Serambi Mekkah in Padang Panjang which is supported by members of PKS party. This “PKS’s model of Islamic schools develop its own characteristic by giving more emphasis on Science and Technology. In terms of religious orientation, it seems that PKS’s model of Islamic schools follows “moderate salafism.” Although PKS is closer to Salafism, it differs with radical salafism like FPI (Islamic Defense Front).

Source

The greening of Islamic education in Indonesia

In a remote part of Central Java, Indonesia’s most populous island, there is a rather unusual form of environmentalism taking root. Shadowed by the great Merapi volcano and surrounded by fertile fields of rice and sugarcane, a small school is graduating environmentalists whose commitment to the earth is not based on Western conservation texts but rather predicated in values derived from Islam. The head of the school, Nasruddin Anshari, frequently uses the refrain “one earth, for all”, just as much as he does the usual Islamic invocation of Allah-u Akbar (God is Great).

Indonesia’s pesantren (the local word for a madrassa or religious school) have come under great scrutiny in recent years due to their perceived connections to terrorist incidents such as the Bali bombings in 2005. Even US presidential hopeful Barack Obama felt obliged to distance himself from his childhood days in Indonesia because of a rumour that he too had attended a pesantren, since both his father and stepfather were Muslims. Yet the transformation taking place at Pesantren Lingkungan Giri Ilmu would certainly please most constituencies in the West. Children from the village of Bantul are learning about the importance of preserving their ecosystem as a mark of worshipping God. The tenacity of Islamic religious doctrines that often manifests itself in uncompromising stances on political conflicts is being channelled more positively towards environmental ethics.

In his latest book The Creation, eminent Harvard ecologist E O Wilson writes an open letter to the clergy in which he urges theologians to unite on environmental causes: “The defence of living Nature is a universal value. It doesn’t rise from nor does it promote any religious or ideological dogma. Rather, it serves without discrimination the interests of all humanity.” It seems as though Wilson’s plea is at least being heard in Indonesia — one of the world’s highest biodiversity regions.

To further develop this trend and to link environmental education to a larger agenda of conflict resolution, the United Nations mandated University for Peace held a week-long workshop on peace education in an Islamic context in November 2007. The setting for the workshop was Gadgah Mada University in Yogyakarta, not far from our eco-friendly pesantren. Scholars from numerous Muslim countries gathered to consider various dimensions of peace education and to develop lesson plans for implementation in Islamic schools. I was invited to develop specific ideas on how to use environmental issues within an Islamic context as an instrumental means of peace-building.

It was fairly easy to convince the delegates that the advent of Islam as an organised religion occurred in the desert environment of Arabia, and hence there was considerable attention paid to ecological concerns within Islamic ethics. While Islamic theology is not pantheistic, and shares many of the anthropocentric attributes of other Abrahamic faiths, there is a reverence of nature that stems from essential pragmatism within the faith. Due to resource scarcity, early Muslims realised that long-term development was only possible within ecological constraints which were shared by all of humanity. Thus, the universality of environmental resources provides a valuable template for peace-building that is realised in Islam.

Nevertheless, there are several systemic challenges to the realisation of a sustainable development paradigm within contemporary Islam, largely due to institutional inertia and a reluctance of ulema to engage contemporary issues. First, the Islamic belief of humans as Ashraful Makhloqaat (the most superior creation) poses serious challenges to inculcating environmental ethics, particularly with reference to animal rights. However, this can be countered by considering numerous injunctions about the great responsibility that comes with the status of being a “superior creation”. The concept of khalifa (vicegerent) can be considered an antidote to this concept since the role of a vicegerent is to act as a steward for the land and for all creation.

Second, the Islamic focus on the after-life rather than the present has also led many Muslims to consider environmental and developmental challenges as trivial compared to the hereafter. This has led to a sense of complacence and fatalism about our developmental predicament, since it is deemed the will of God. I felt this strong apathy whilst conducting research on the Islamic schools of Pakistan three years ago. Yet this fatalism is no longer pervasive among the devoutly practicing Muslims of Indonesia. The Islamic religious schools in the world’s largest Muslim country are realising that the most profound act of worship is to conserve natural resources on which all life depends. Just as suicide is forbidden in Islam because of a deep respect for the sanctity of life, so too is the deliberate desecration of the life support systems that make our planet so unique.

Even beyond Indonesia there are several promising signs that narratives of policy makers are changing positively. The Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Science, based in Birmingham, UK, is developing numerous programmes for religious institutions in Muslim countries around the world. Even development donors are beginning to take note of such efforts. In late 2006, the US Agency for International Development launched an environmental education program in Tanzania in partnership with NGOs such as the Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA) and the Jane Goodall Institute. The “Roots & Shoots” programme will target 12,650 primary school students and 12,650 madrassa school students. As part of this effort, two hundred and twenty primary school teachers and 220 madrassa teachers will be trained on coastal and marine ecosystem issues.

Even hard-line states like Iran are taking positive steps in this regard and are quite proud of the fact that the highly successful Ramsar convention on Wetland Protection takes its name from the Iranian city where it was signed in 1971. Despite several subsequent years of conflict and environmental indifference, in 2004 the Iranian government organised an international conference on environmental security to which Americans were also invited and where a strong case was made for using environmental conservation for peace-building. The former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami stated during his tenure that “pollution poses an even greater threat than war and suggested that the fight to preserve the environment might be the most positive issue for bringing the Gulf neighbours together”.

The usually profligate Gulf States are also catching on to the trend and trying to reduce their huge ecological footprint — albeit with modest results so far. Abu Dhabi has committed itself to establish the world’s first carbon neutral city of 40,000 residents by 2012. Masdar city (which means the source in Arabic) will have at its core an educational institution and numerous environmental technology firms to support a sustainable economy.

If the energy of Islamic scholars and their madrassas as well as our development tsars can be collectively channelled towards such positive acts of social and environmental activism, perhaps we can begin to appreciate our common humanity. Rather than harping on the divisive rhetoric of tribe, sect and political persuasion, we have a theological and teleological imperative to “green our society”.

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Dr Saleem H Ali is associate dean for graduate education at the University of Vermont’s Rubenstein School of Environment. He is the editor of the new book Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict Resolution (MIT Press) and can be contacted at saleem@alum.mit.edu
Source.

The Rise of the Democratic Police State

August 19, 2005
The Rise of the Democratic Police State

by John Pilger
Thomas Friedman is a famous columnist on the New York Times. He has been described as "a guard dog of U.S. foreign policy." Whatever America's warlords have in mind for the rest of humanity, Friedman will bark it. He boasts that "the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist." He promotes bombing countries and says World War Three has begun.

Friedman's latest bark is about free speech, which his country's Constitution is said to safeguard. He wants the State Department to draw up a blacklist of those who make "wrong" political statements. He is referring not only to those who advocate violence, but to those who believe American actions are the root cause of the current terrorism. The latter group, which he describes as "just one notch less despicable than the terrorists," includes most Americans and Britons, according to the latest polls.

Friedman wants a "War of Ideas report" that names those who try to understand and explain, for example, why London was bombed. These are "excuse makers" who "deserve to be exposed." He borrows the term "excuse makers" from James Rubin, who was Madeleine Albright's chief apologist at the State Department. Albright, who rose to secretary of state under President Clinton, said that the death of half a million Iraqi infants as a result of an American-driven blockade was a "price" that was "worth it." Of all the interviews I have filmed in official Washington, Rubin's defense of this mass killing is unforgettable.

Farce is never far away in these matters. The "excuse makers" would also include the CIA, which has warned that "Iraq [since the invasion] has replaced Afghanistan as the training ground for the next generation of 'professionalized' terrorists.'" On to the Friedman/Rubin blacklist go the spooks!

Like so much else during the Blair era, this McCarthyite rubbish has floated across the Atlantic and is now being recycled by the prime minister as proposed police-state legislation, little different from the fascist yearnings of Friedman and other extremists. For Friedman's blacklist, read Tony Blair's proposed database of proscribed opinions, bookshops, Web sites.

The British human rights lawyer Linda Christian asks: "Are those who feel a huge sense of injustice about the same causes as the terrorists – Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib – to be stopped from speaking forthrightly about their anger? Because terrorism is now defined in our law as actions abroad, will those who support liberation movements in, for example, Kashmir or Chechnya be denied freedom of expression?" Any definition of terrorism, she points out, should "encompass the actions of terrorist states engaged in unlawful wars."

Of course, Blair is silent on Western state terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere; and for him to moralize about "our values" insults the fact of his blood-crime in Iraq. His budding police state will, he hopes, have the totalitarian powers he has longed for since 2001, when he suspended habeas corpus and introduced unlimited house arrest without trial. The Law Lords, Britain's highest judiciary, have tried to stop this. Last December, Lord Hoffmann said that Blair's attacks on human rights were a greater threat to freedom than terrorism. On July 26, Blair emoted that the entire British nation was under threat and abused the judiciary in terms, as Simon Jenkins noted, "that would do credit to his friend Vladimir Putin." What we are seeing in Britain is the rise of the democratic police state.

Should you be tempted to dismiss all this as esoteric or merely mad, travel to any Muslim community in Britain, especially in the northwest, and sense the state of siege and fear. On July 15, Blair's Britain of the future was glimpsed when the police raided the Iqra Learning Center and bookstore near Leeds. The Iqra Trust is a well-known charity that promotes Islam worldwide as "a peaceful religion which covers every walk of life." The police smashed down the door, wrecked the shop and took away antiwar literature which they described as "anti-Western."

Among this was, reportedly, a DVD of the Respect Party MP George Galloway addressing the U.S. Senate and a New Statesman article of mine illustrated by a much-published photograph of a Palestinian man in Gaza attempting to shield his son from Israeli bullets before the boy was shot to death. The photograph was said to be "working people up," meaning Muslim people. Clearly, David Gibbons, this journal's esteemed art director, who chose this illustration, will be called before the Blair Incitement Tribunal. One of my books, The New Rulers of the World, was also apparently confiscated. It is not known whether the police have yet read the chapter that documents how the Americans, with help from MI6 and the SAS, created, armed, and bankrolled the terrorists of the Islamic mujahedin, not least Osama bin Laden.

The raid was deliberately theatrical, with the media tipped off. Two of the alleged July 7 bombers had been volunteers in the shop almost four years ago. "When they became hardliners," said a community youth worker. "They left and have never been back, and they've had nothing to do with the shop." The raid was watched by horrified local people who are now scared, angry, and bitter. I spoke to Muserat Sujawal, who has lived in the area for 31 years and is respected widely for her management of the nearby Hamara Community Center. She told me, "There was no justification for the raid. The whole point of the shop is to teach how Islam is a community-based religion. My family has used the shop for years, buying, for example, the Arabic equivalent of Sesame Street. They did it to put fear in our hearts." James Dean, a Bradford secondary school teacher, said, "I am teaching myself Urdu because I have multi-ethnic classes, and the shop has been very helpful with tapes."

The police have the right to pursue every lead in their hunt for bombers, but scaremongering is not their right. Sir Ian Blair, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner who understands how the media can be used and spends a lot of time in television studios, has yet to explain why he announced that the killing in the London Underground of the Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes was "directly linked" to terrorism, when he must have known the truth. Muslim people all over Britain report the presence of police "video vans" cruising their streets, filming everyone. "We have become like ghettoes under siege," said one man too frightened to be named. "Do they know what this is doing to our young people?"

The other day Blair said, "We are not having any of this nonsense about [the bombings having anything] to do with what the British are doing in Iraq or Afghanistan, or support for Israel, or support for America, or any of the rest of it. It is nonsense and we have to confront it as that." This "raving," as the American writer Mike Whitney observed, "is part of a broader strategy to dismiss the obvious facts about terror and blame the victims of American-British aggression. It's a tactic that was minted in Tel Aviv and perfected over 37 years of occupation. It is predicated on the assumption that terrorism emerges from an amorphous, religious-based ideology that transforms its adherents into ruthless butchers."

Professor Robert Pape of the University of Chicago has examined every act of suicide terrorism over the past 25 years. He refutes the assumption that suicide bombers are mainly driven by "an evil ideology independent of other circumstances." He said, "The facts are that since 1980, half the attacks have been secular. Few of the terrorists fit the standard stereotype. … Half of them are not religious fanatics at all. In fact, over 95 percent of suicide attacks around the world [are not about] religion, but a specific strategic purpose – to compel the United States and other Western countries to abandon military commitments on the Arabian Peninsula and in countries they view as their homeland or prize greatly. … The link between anger over American, British, and Western military [action] and al-Qaeda's ability to recruit suicide terrorists to kill us could not be tighter."

So we have been warned, yet again. Terrorism is the logical consequence of American and British "foreign policy" whose infinitely greater terrorism we need to recognize, and debate, as a matter of urgency.